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The power of music to arouse garden-variety emotions has attracted attention from 
musicians, psychologists, and philosophers over decades. Despite its widespread 
acknowledgement, there is no agreement on how pure music with no propositional 
content can induce such a wide range of emotions. Jenefer Robinson coined this 
problem the puzzle of musical emotion.1 In this essay, I will first discuss why musical 
emotion is a puzzle. Then, Jesse Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion and his solution 
to the puzzle will be discussed.2 Prinz regards an emotion as an embodied appraisal, 
and a musical emotion as an illusory embodied appraisal which is a by-product of the 
adaptive emotion system. I argue that it is problematic to regard musical emotions as 
illusions for two reasons: 1) the bodily responses aroused by music are not specific 
enough to produce an illusion of a real emotion; 2) musical emotion is adaptive by 
itself in the sense that it is a mirroring-based simulation of the emotion represented by 
music, and such mirroring system plays an important role in interpersonal emotion 
communications. 
 
I.        THE PUZZLE OF MUSICAL EMOTION 
The puzzle of musical emotion refers to the idea that garden-variety emotions can be 
aroused by pure music. By pure music, I mean instrumental music with no lyrics. This 
restriction is to ensure that what arouses the emotion is the music by itself, but not the 
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propositional contents of the lyric. ‘Garden-variety emotions’, on the other hand, is a 
term coined by Peter Kivy, to refer to a wide range of emotions which music is 
supposed to arouse, such as joy, sadness, fear, and anger.3  
     Many studies have shown that music arouses different emotional bodily changes in 
the subjects. For example, Lundqvist et al discovered that happy music generated 
more zygomatic facial muscle activity, greater skin conductance, and lower finger 
temperature than sad music.4 Rickard found that emotionally powerful music elicited 
significantly larger number of chills in the subject than relaxing music.5 On the other 
hand, music is widely used in the mood induction procedures of different 
psychological studies. For example, Adaman and Blaney used music to induce elation 
and depression in subjects in order to test the effect of mood on creativity.6 Yan used 
music to induce disgust in subjects in order to test the effect of mood on moral 
judgment.7  So, it is at least empirically plausible to claim that music can arouse 
garden-variety emotions. The question is how. 
     Proponents of the cognitive theory of emotion have a difficult time answering this 
how-question. For example, Martha Nussbaum claims that emotion is a value 
judgment about an intentional object. Her grief about the death of her mother is a 
judgment that “a person of enormous value, who was central in my life, is there no 
longer.”8 Other cognitivists, such as Solomon and Gordon, share the idea that emotion 
must be about something. In other word, every emotion has an intentional object 
which arouses it. If this is true, it is not clear how pure music can arouse emotions. 
Music cannot be the right intentional object of emotion. When you listen to a sad 
piece of music, your sadness is not about the music since music is not a suitable object 
of sadness, normally understood. When a piece of music gives you a feeling of fear, 
you make no judgment that the music is threatening you. In short, musical emotion is 
a puzzle because emotion should be, or should involve, an appraisal about its 
intentional object, but music cannot be the appropriate intentional object of emotion 
due to its lack of propositional content. 
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II.    PRINZ’S PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF EMOTION AND ITS SOLUTION TO THE 
PUZZLE OF MUSICAL EMOTION 
Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion regards musical emotion as an illusion and 
explains how music can arouse emotions without being the real intentional object of 
these emotions.9 In this section, I will introduce Prinz’s theory of emotion and explain 
why musical emotion is an illusion under his account. As a neo-Jamesian, Prinz 
suggests that emotions are embodied appraisals which represent important organism-
environment relations by registering the bodily changes caused by an external 
stimulus. Borrowing from Lazarus10, Prinz understands those organism-environment 
relations related to emotions as core relational themes. For example, the core 
relational theme of anger is “a demeaning offense against me and mine”11 and of 
fright is “facing an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger.” 12 
Drawing on Dretske’s causal theory of mental representation,13  Prinz argues that 
emotion can represent these core relational themes because the corresponding bodily 
changes are reliably caused by them. So, by registering the bodily changes, an 
emotion represents a core relational theme. Prinz writes, “Each emotion is both an 
internal body monitor and a detector of dangers, threats, losses, or other matters of 
concern. Emotions are gut reactions; they use our bodies to tell us how we are faring 
in the world.” 14  Take fear as an example. When a bear is approaching us, our 
embodied appraisal represents the bear as “a threat” by registering the bodily changes, 
such as beating heart, sweating palms, wide open eyes, trembling, released adrenaline, 
which are reliably caused by a threatening bear. This embodied appraisal, according 
to Prinz, is the fear.   
     In response to the puzzle of musical emotion, Prinz acknowledges that emotion can 
be aroused by music even though the listener is totally aware of the fact that there is 
nothing for her to be emotional about. He said, “Consider sadness evoked by nonvocal 
music. In the hands of a good composer, a D-minor chord can send listeners into the 
abyss. Listeners know that there has been no loss, but the floodwaters of despair well 
                                                           
9
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up inside them.”15 Prinz explains this phenomenon by regarding musical emotion as 
illusion. It is a illusion because, unlike typical emotion which tracks bodily states that 
are reliably caused by a core relational theme, the bodily states for which musical 
emotion tracks are not caused by a real core relational theme, even though the listener 
feels that it is. For example, fear is supposed to be an embodied appraisal which 
represents “a threat” by registering the fearful bodily changes reliably caused by a 
threatening object. However, a musical emotion of fear falsely represents the music as 
“a threat” by registering the fearful bodily changes aroused by the music. In this sense, 
musical emotion is an illusion. Moreover, this illusion will not go away even if the 
listener is aware of the illusory nature of her emotion. Prinz explains this feature of 
musical emotion by regarding emotion as informationally encapsulated. Following 
Fodor,16 Prinz thinks that “If a perceptual illusion persists even after we learn that it is 
an illusion, then it resides in a processing system that is not directly influenced by 
knowledge.”17 Take the Müller-Lyer illusion as an example: 
 
 
 
 
 
Line (a) looks longer than Line (b). If we measure the two lines with a ruler or cover 
the arrows at the ends of both lines, we will find that the lengths of the two lines are 
identical. However, even if we realize that our impression that (a) is longer than (b) is 
caused by the direction of the arrows at their ends, we still can’t help seeing (a) as 
longer than (b). In other word, our illusion doesn’t go away even after we learn that it 
is an illusion. In this sense, Prinz holds that the perception of the lengths of the 
Müller-Lyer lines is informationally encapsulated. Musical emotion, as a kind of 
perceptual illusions, is similarly encapsulated. Even if we realize that the 
representation of the musical emotion is falsidical, say (i.e. there is no threat 
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confronting us when the music makes us feel fear), we can’t help perceiving the music 
as representing a real core relational theme, say, a real threat. Such musical illusion is 
a special case where our system of emotion goes wrong. Prinz regards it as an 
advantage of his perceptual theory of emotion that allows for this possibility on the 
grounds that no perceptual system can be infallible. 
 
III.      WHY IS MUSICAL EMOTION NOT AN ILLUSION?  
 
III.i. Musical bodily responses are not specific enough to represent the core relational 
theme of fully-fledged emotions 
According to Prinz, emotions represent core relational themes by registering bodily 
responses because the latter are reliably caused by the emotional stimulus. On the 
other hand, an emotion could misrepresent a core relational theme; the bodily 
responses registered could be aroused by something unrelated to the core relational 
theme of a paradigmatic emotion, but still be identical to the bodily responses aroused 
by the paradigmatic emotion. Notice that the sameness of bodily responses is essential 
here. If the bodily responses aroused by music are not the same as the bodily 
responses aroused by a real emotional stimulus, then by registering the musical bodily 
responses, we are not illusively representing the core relational theme of music as the 
core relational theme of a real emotional stimulus; instead, we are representing a 
totally different core relational theme. Take a sad piece of music as an example. Only 
if the sad music arouses the same weeping as real sadness does would our brain 
illusorily register these responses as being caused by a real loss, which represents the 
core relational theme of sadness, say, an irrevocable loss. If the bodily response 
aroused by the sad music is very different from that aroused by a real sadness, our 
brain will not illusorily register them as being caused by a real loss. Instead, our brain 
will register them as being caused by something else; a different core relational theme, 
say, a mild disturbance, may then be represented.   
     So, how much are the bodily responses aroused by music similar to the bodily 
responses of a real emotion? Philosophers have long recognized that musical emotions 
are not comparable to real emotions. While Stephen Davies says that musical emotion 
can only be “a weaker version of ordinary emotions,”18Jerrold Levinson suggests that: 
                                                           
18
  Davies (1994), pp.299-307. 
MUK YAN WONG 
 
29 
 
 
[Musical emotion] is not in truth a case of full-fledged emotion. This is mainly because 
music neither supplies an appropriate object for an emotion to be directed on nor generates 
the associated beliefs, desires, or attitudes regarding an object that are essential to an 
emotion being what it is.19  
 
Concerning their corresponding bodily responses, the discrepancy between musical 
bodily responses and real emotional bodily responses could be understood in two 
ways.  
     First, musical emotions fail to produce some important bodily responses aroused 
by fully-fledged emotions. In defence of the ability of music to affect physiology, 
Robinson20 cites numerous researches, showing that negative music is associated with: 
changes in heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance, and finger temperature;21  
decreased heart and pulse rates;22 changes in skin conductivity resistance;23 changes in 
cardio-respiratory activity;24 and changes in hormonal activity.25 Although this list 
may sound comprehensive, it misses out two important components of a fully-fledged 
emotion; namely, facial expression and action tendency. Paul Ekman, the inventor of 
the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), sees the face as “the primary theatre” of 
emotion.26 He argues that every basic emotion has a unique set of facial expressions, 
which are controlled by thousands of muscles. Nico Frijda defines action tendency as 
“states of action readiness that prepare and guide actions for achieving a particular 
relation with the object that the emotion is about (relations such as proximity, being 
remote from, or opposing).”27 For example, the action tendency of fear is to flee, of 
anger is to fight, and so on. Frijda thinks that these action tendencies “are among the 
main features for assigning major emotion category labels to one’s own emotions and 
those of other people or animals.”28 Scherer and Zentner, after reviewing various 
researches on the relation between music and emotional responses, conclude that 
“evidence for the production or motor patterns and action tendencies by music” and 
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“evidence for the facilitation of facial expression via music” are “rare.” 29 A possible 
explanation of this rarity is that the association between musical emotion and action 
tendency and facial expression is too weak for psychologists to work on. Even the 
exceptional study conducted by Witvliet and Vrana which shows that the innervations 
of the zygomatic muscle or corrugators muscles on our faces are stimulated by 
different kinds of music fails to convince that musical emotion produces facial 
expression similar to paradigmatic emotion.30  As suggested by Ekman, the facial 
expression of any basic emotion is controlled by thousands of muscles, of which the 
zygomatic and corrugators muscle are only two.31 In short, lacking the corresponding 
facial expressions and action tendencies, musical emotions can hardly be regarded as 
fully-fledged emotions. 
     Secondly, concerning those bodily responses which are shared by musical emotion 
and paradigmatic emotion (such as change of heart rate, skin conductance responses, 
and so on), I argue that we have no reason to believe that their potency is identical or 
similar to each other. In other words, I think it cannot be true that the power of an 
emotion aroused by music is as strong as the power of an emotion aroused by a 
natural stimulus. Even though a piece of music could make us sad, it is of no 
comparison to the grief aroused by the death of a loved one. Most, if not all, studies 
discussed above show a qualitative, but not a quantitative agreement between the 
bodily responses of musical emotion and paradigmatic emotion. Assume that heart 
rate is the only bodily response caused by fear. The fear aroused by music is in 
qualitative agreement with the fear aroused by a natural stimulus if and only if both 
fears cause an increase in heart rate. They are in quantitative agreement if and only if 
they increase the heart rate by the same amount. Only if two emotions are in 
quantitative agreement could we say that their bodily responses are identical to each 
other. A qualitative agreement is not enough for such identity because different 
emotions may share the same qualitative trend of bodily changes. For example, both 
anger and fear would lead to an increase heart rate. The same direction of trend does 
not mean that their ability to affect heart rate is the same. Scherer and Zentner, while 
acknowledging Krumhansl’s discovery of the bodily responses music can produce, 32 
admit that “the matching of the emotion-specific physiological responses pattern… 
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were far less encouraging.”33 For, “While, in some cases, the changes for a particular 
parameter went in a similar direction as the theoretically postulated ones, it would be 
difficult to argue that complete physiological response patterns, prototypical for 
‘discrete’ or ‘basic’ emotions, were found.”34  In order to establish a quantitative 
agreement between the bodily responses aroused by musical emotion and 
paradigmatic emotion, psychologists would have to use very naturalistic induction of 
emotion (e.g., put a subject in a genuinely dangerous situation) and measure the 
aroused bodily responses to see if the quantity of change, not just the trend, is 
identical to those aroused by music. No such experiment has ever been done yet. That 
means we have no empirical evidence to support the idea that the potency of the 
bodily responses aroused by paradigmatic emotion and musical emotion are identical 
to each other.   
      In short, there is no evidence suggesting that musical emotion can arouse facial 
expression and action tendency as paradigmatic emotions do. Nor is there evidence 
supporting the idea that the potency of the bodily responses aroused by music is the 
same as those aroused by a natural stimulus. So, I conclude that musical bodily 
responses are not identical to natural emotional bodily responses. If this is true, then 
the registering of the former would not be regarded as an illusive registering of the 
latter, which means there would not be a misrepresentation of musical core relational 
theme as a real core relational theme. Instead, a different core relational theme would 
be represented by the registering of a different set of bodily changes aroused by music. 
In this sense, musical emotion is not an illusion. 
 
III.ii Musical Emotion as a Mirroring-Based Simulation of the Emotion Represented 
by Music 
By arguing that musical emotion as an illusion, Prinz suggests that it is nothing more 
than a side effect which ‘hitchhikes’ on the adaptive emotion system. It does not serve 
any evolutionary function by itself. Following Alvin Goldman, I argue that musical 
emotions are adaptive in the sense that they are a mirroring-based simulation 
mechanism that helps us to read others’ emotions.35 Social psychologists have long 
recognized the importance of reading others’ emotions. Correctly detecting the anger 
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of enemies may help us decide whether we should fight or flee. Reading the fearful 
expression of other conspecifics may help us notice that a predator is approaching. 
Disgust is another good example. Bloom says, “Vomit serves as a form of nonverbal 
communication, one that bypasses conscious reasoning. When you vomit, it is like 
shouting, ‘We may have eaten poisonous food. Everyone, stop eating, and empty your 
stomachs!’”36 The question is, what role do musical emotions play in such life or 
death mindreading situations? 
     According to Levitin, and also Cross, music is an authentic expression of 
emotion.37  A strong interpretation of this claim suggests that music expresses an 
emotion by authentically revealing the emotion of the composer. This cannot be true 
for two reasons. First, the composer can fail to express her emotion in the music. 
Second, she can express an emotion in the music without feeling it herself.38 A weak 
interpretation would be that music represents an emotion by reliably co-occurring 
with an emotion. In this sense, music is like the beeping of a smoke detector which 
represents a fire by reliably co-occurring with a fire. The beeping is a signal of the 
presence of a fire only. It tells us nothing about where the fire starts, when it starts, or 
who starts it. By the same token, music is a signal of the presence of an emotion only. 
It tells us nothing about whether the emotion is possessed by the composer, the 
performer, the listener, or anyone else. In other words, the weak interpretation avoids 
the question of whose emotion is being expressed by the music. No matter who 
possesses the emotion, as long as the emotion reliably co-occurs with the music, the 
music represents the emotion. Numerous studies have shown that different features of 
music are closely associated with different emotions. For example, Ohala, and also 
Gussenhoven, have shown that lower sounds are usually associated with confidence, 
dominance, or aggression, whereas higher sounds are associated with submission, 
subordination, absence of threat, and uncertainty.39 Wider prosodic contours produced 
with more effort are associated with enthusiasm, obligingness, authority, and 
insistence, whereas narrower contours produced with less effort are associated with 
lack of commitment and enthusiasm. Juslin found that small vibrato extent is 
associated with sadness and tenderness, whereas medium-large vibrato extent is 
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associated with anger and happiness.40 All these studies show that music can be an 
authentic expression of emotions in the weak sense.  
      Following Goldman, I argue that we read the emotion represented by a piece of 
music by simulating the same emotion in ourselves through a mirroring system.41 The 
vocal mirror neurons in us fire when the music we hear is an authentic expression of 
emotions. Such firing will generate an emotion mirroring the emotion represented by 
the music. This mirrored emotion is the musical emotion. The mechanism of musical 
emotion is adaptive because the same mechanism is used to read emotions from 
others’ vocal expression. Mirroring systems were first discovered in monkeys by 
Rizzolatti et al.42 Action mirror neurons fired not only when the monkeys performed 
the associated actions, they also fired when an observing monkey watched other 
monkeys performing the actions. A similar mirroring system was discovered in 
humans by Rizzolatti et al,43 and was believed to be located in the rostral part of the 
inferior parietal lobule, the caudal sector of par opercularis and the adjacent part of 
the premotor cortex. Moreover, vocal mirror neurons were discovered by Kohler et 
al.44 These neurons, which locate in the premotor cortex, fire both when the subjects 
perform an action and when they hear a sound related to that action. I suggest that this 
is how the mechanism of musical emotion works. Music is an authentic expression of 
emotions. When one hears the music, the relevant vocal mirror neurons fire and put us 
into an emotion similar or identical to the emotion represented by the music. Take a 
piece of scary music as an example. With a fast tempo, large tempo variability, minor 
mode, high pitch, and staccato articulation, such a piece of music authentically 
represents the emotion of fear. These features of the music, on the other hand, trigger 
the firing of the vocal mirror neurons of subjects and put the subjects into the emotion 
of fear. The same mechanism explains why we feel sad when we hear someone weep 
and feel happy when we hear someone laugh.45 This mechanism of reading emotions 
from vocal expressions is of utmost importance for the survival of organisms. In this 
sense, musical emotions are adaptive and are not “illusions” in Prinz’s sense.  
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